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INTRODUCTION
In the early days of telecommunication,' technically advanced nations quickly
recognized the usefulness of the telegraph in international commerce. There was,
however, a considerable obstacle to the development of the new technology's com-
mercial potential. As one observer of this era of telecommunication history points
out, "humanity could not fully benefit from all the miraculous possibilities of the
electrical telegraph, that tiny instrument which human genius had just invented,
unless it could move beyond the narrow, rigid concept of national sovereignty as
something absolute, sacrosanct and inviolate. ' 2 The success of international teleg-
raphy depended upon the cooperation of nations in permitting the orderly flow of
telegraphic messages across national borders and in standardizing equipment and
rates.
The need for international cooperation became even more important when
wireless communication came into use. Because electromagnetic waves
embodying radio messages travel through the air rather than through wires or
cables, radio transmissions are not restricted by the territorial considerations that
first prompted international coordination of wire communications. Nevertheless,
radio could not be used successfully for such important purposes as maritime
safety and international commerce without international cooperation and
standardization.
Furthermore, even a nation's domestic radio communications can have inter-
national ramifications. The physical properties of radio make it difficult to confine
transmissions within political boundaries. If the right technical and atmospheric
conditions exist, radio waves originating in one country can be received, not just in
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1. Hereinafter, "telecommunication" will refer to all forms of long long-distance, electronic communi-
cation both by wire or cable (e.g., telegraph and,telephone) and by radio (e.g., AM and FM radio broad-
casting, shortwave radio, aeronautical radio and television).
2. Mili, InternationalJur dicton in Telecommunication Affairs, 40 TELECOM. J. 122, 123 (1973).
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neighboring jurisdictions, but also in places that are quite remote from the trans-
mitter. 3 Harmful interference can be averted or minimized only through careful
coordination of the power, direction and timing of transmissions on the same or
adjacent frequencies. It is well recognized that unless users of radio everywhere
participate in the orderly use of the spectrum, the value of radio as a means of
national as well as international communication would be greatly diminished and,
in some circumstances, totally destroyed. 4
In his examination of international organization, Goodspeed attributes cooper-
ative efforts in technical fields such as telecommunication to their physical charac-
teristic of "transcending purely national frontiers." 5 International cooperation is
even more important to telecommunication today because of conflicts that may be
produced by the tremendous rate of technical progress in the field.
This article will examine the potential for conflict and the need for interna-
tional cooperation in the contemporary telecommunication industry, with a par-
ticular focus on the role of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) in
international conflict management. After addressing particular aspects of modern
telecommunication which invite international conflict, the article will present an
overview of the ITU as the principal instrumentality for maintaining world order
in telecommunication. The Union's importance in conflict prevention, dispute
resolution, and arbitration will be analyzed in detail. Finally, this article will
assess the success of the ITU in conflict management and evaluate the need for
change in the ITU as it enters a new era of international telecommunication.
I
CONTEMPORARY TELECOMMUNICATION CONFLICTS
Technology has advanced to the point at which integration of all telecommuni-
cation systems into a vast, worldwide network consisting of wire, radio and satellite
components is a real possibility.6 International standardization and coordinated
interconnection of national wire communication systems will be critical to the real-
ization of this potential. The failure or inability of any nation to conform to com-
plex international standards will deprive it of important benefits and may impede
other nations from taking full advantage of the new technology as well.
3. An AM radio station, for example, transmits radio waves along the curvature of the earth (ground
waves), along line-of-sight paths (direct waves), and straight up (sky-waves). Sky-waves, which are
reflected back to earth by particles in various layers of the ionosphere, are responsible for the reception and
interference of AM radio at often unpredictable locations at extreme distances from the transmitter, partic-
ularly after sunset. For a discussion of the physical properties of radio transmission, see R. HILLIARD,
RADIO BROADCASTING 52-104 (2d ed. 1974).
4. See, e.g., S. CHEN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 147 (rev. ed.
1979).
5. S. GOODSPEED, THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 4 (2d ed. 1967).
6. The possibility of instantaneous, worldwide information transfer no longer exists just in the realm
of science fiction. The development of space communication, for instance, enables us to witness live events
taking place on other continents or even on other planets. Telecommunication combining wire, space and
radio technology will permit the international transfer of funds and data among branches of multinational
banks and corporations. For a discussion of the practical international applications of modern telecommu-
nication technology, see J. MARTIN, FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 339-45 (2d ed.
1977); McGuire, The Information Age. An Introduction to Transborder Data Flow, 20 JURIMETRICS J. 1 (1979).
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Recent technological breakthroughs have also made available a variety of rea-
sonably priced equipment that has in turn created an unprecedented demand for
radio frequencies. 7 Because the commercial applications of radio are quite lucra-
tive," existing users of radio in industrialized nations are consuming more spec-
trum space.9 At the same time, demand for frequencies from the developing
nations has contributed to the crowding of the spectrum because remote or iso-
lated areas and people can be linked together more quickly and economically with
radio communication than with transportation systems or wire communication
systems. Like competitors for other limited world resources, potential users of
radio are bound to come into conflict.
Technology is also producing new modes of telecommunication with their own
potential for international conflict. The communications satellite is one such new
device with major international ramifications.' 0 Because communications from
space satellites can generally be directed to larger geographic areas of the earth
with greater reliability than can conventional radio transmissions, the need for
international cooperation and the potential for conflict in the satellite field is
accentuated. As the use of satellite technology increases, international policy con-
flicts over occupancy of the geostationary orbit I may be manifested in head-to-
head conflicts among nations competing for a finite number of orbital slots in
7. Although the continuing advances in telecommunication technology are expected to increase the
efficiency with which we use the spectrum (thereby enabling more users to occupy less space), at present,
demand for radio frequencies is meeting or even surpassing available capacity. See J. MARTIN, supra note
6, at 435-36. In recent testimony before the House Subcommittee on International Operations, the
Chairman of the FCC discussed the crowding of the AM radio spectrum and recent problems of Cuban
radio stations' interference with AM radio broadcasting in the United States. Statement by Mark S.
Fowler, Chairman of FCC, House Subcommittee on International Operations (June 4, 1981)
(unpublished).
8. According to the most recent Annual Report of the FCC, the United States commercial television
and radio broadcast industry reported combined revenues of $10.7 billion in calendar 1979. See 46 FCC
ANN. REP. 30 (1980).
9. The increase in frequency usage is reflected in the growth of television broadcasting in selected
industrialized nations during the last decade. 1980 data reflect both operating full-service (F) and
relay/repeater (R) transmitters.
Operating TV Stations
COUNTRY 1970 1980
Australia 82 118(F) 102(R)
Canada 76 409(F) 645(R)
Denmark I 10(F) 23(R)
Japan 2200 (F&R) 1102(F) 5333(R)
U.S.S.R. 8 350(F) 1500(R)
United Kingdom 96 281(F) 929(R)
United States 872 1020(F) 3915(R)
1971 BROADCASTING Y.B. A- 117, E-71-74; 1981 BROADCASTING CABLE Y.B. A-2, F-63-67; 50 TELEVISION
FACTBOOK 341-a (Services vol. 1981-82 ed.).
10. Space communications technology makes use of transmit stations (satellite "uplinks") on the
ground, which relay programming or information to satellites orbiting in outer space. The satellites then
retransmit the signal back to earth receive stations that may be connected by radio or wire to ultimate
reception points. For a detailed discussion of satellite communications see Ploman, Satedlite Broadcasting,
National Sovereignty and the Free Fow of Information, in NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL COM-
MUNICATION 154 (K. Nordenstreng & H. Schiller ed. 1979); Comment, International Regulation of Digital
Satellite Systems, 32 FED. COM. L.J. 393, 410-36 (1980).
11. The geostationary orbit is the location approximately 22,300 miles above the earth's equator
which permits a satellite placed there to remain in a stationary orbit with respect to the earth's rotation.
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which to position satellites. Adherence to precise technical standards will be neces-
sary to optimize use of outer space for communications purposes. Mofeover,
because of the tremendous investment involved in deploying communications sys-
tems in outer space, the stakes in any controversy will be extremely high.
12
In times of shortages of critical resources such as food and energy, effective
communication networks can greatly facilitate the movement of resources to areas
with the greatest need or, more realistically, to those with the deepest pockets.
Equally important, free and open dialogue between nations can help to diffuse the
increased tensions that can be expected to arise between the haves and the have-
nots. Although the technology exists to establish and maintain the necessary tele-
communication networks for these purposes, it cannot be put to use in a climate of
international conflict.
II
THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION
The principal instrumentality for maintaining world order in telecommunica-
tion has been and continues to be the International Telecommunication Union
(ITU), a specialized agency of the United Nations which headquarters in Geneva,
Switzerland. 13 The ITU's focus traditionally has been on the technical aspects of
international telecommunication. Until recently, the organization generally has
avoided becoming embroiled in political issues, concentrating instead on insuring
that the airwaves remain free of interference and that the requisite degree of tech-
nical standardization exists for a free flow of information regardless of content.' 4
Events at the most recent ITU Plenipotentiary Conference in Nairobi, 15 however,
suggest that the ITU may face greater difficulties in the future in withstanding
efforts of some member nations to use the organization as a forum for venting
political and ideological concerns unrelated to telecommunication. As this article
12. Although the cost of satellite communication channels is dropping, it has been estimated that a
direct broadcast satellite system consisting of three orbiting space satellites and a ground "back-up" can
run as high as 400 million dollars. See SATELLITE WEEK, June 22, 1980, at 5.
13. The ITU was established in 1932 by the merger of the International Telegraph Union and the
International Radiotelegraph Union. See International Telecommunication Convention, Dec. 9, 1932, 49
Stat. 2391, T.S. No. 867. A number of other international organizations also deal with telecommunication
issues; however, they have more restricted memberships and deal with more limited aspects of telecommu-
nication than does the ITU. For a discussion of some of the prominent ones see W. EMERY, NATIONAL
AND INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS OF BROADCASTING: THEIR HISTORY, OPERATION AND CONTROL, 516-31
(1969); Note, Toward the Free Flow of lnformation. Direct Television Broadcasting via Satellite, 13 J. INT'L L. &
ECON. 329 (1979).
14. Provisions of the United Nations Charter and various international human rights agreements
treat political and content-related telecommunication issues such as freedom of expression and propa-
ganda. See Paust, International Law and Control of the Media." Terror, Regression and the Alternatives, 53 IND. L.J.
621 (1978). Despite efforts to keep the ITU's focus technical, political issues have begun to surface at
recent major ITU conferences. See, e.g., Dep't of State, REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE UNITED
STATES DELEGATION TO THE WORLD ADMINISTRATIVE RADIO CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATION UNION 106 (T.D. No. 116, 1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 WARC Report]; Dep't
of State, REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE PLENIPOTENTIARY CONFERENCE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION 7-8 (T.D. No. 43, 1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 PLENI-
POTENTIARY CONFERENCE REPORT].
15. See infra text accompanying notes 28-30.
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goes to press, the ITU has narrowly avoided an effort by Arab bloc nations to oust
Israel from the Conference, an effort which prompted the United States, one of the
ITU's major financial contributors, to threaten a walkout from the Conference
and possible withdrawal from the organization.' 6 This unfortunate incident left
no time for many critical telecommunication objectives on the conference agenda.
Pursuant to the International Telecommunication Convention,' 7 the ITU's
governing document, the organization is authorized to promulgate regulations
governing telecommunication practices of its members, to collect and disseminate
information on telecommunication issues, to provide technical assistance to devel-
oping nations, and to engage in research and development on international appli-
cations of telecommunication technology.' 8 Inherent in the ITU's general
objectives and specific duties is an important role in the prevention and resolution
of international disputes. Full appreciation of this role requires a basic under-
standing of the ITU's background and current structure.
A. Background
The ITU is a direct descendant of the International Telegraph Union, which
was established in 1865.19 ITU historian George A. Codding, Jr., contends that
the present organization "can be considered the oldest existing international
organization and the forerunner of many of the international organizations
16. See COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, Oct. 25, 1982, at 1.
17. International Telecommunication Convention, Oct. 25, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 2497, T.I.A.S. No. 8572
[hereinafter cited as 1973 Convention].
18. Article 4 sets forth the purposes and duties of the Union as follows:
1. The purposes of the Union are:
(a) to maintain and extend international cooperation for the improvement and rational use of tele-
communications of all kinds;
(b) to promote the development of technical facilities and their most efficient operation with a view
to improving the efficiency of telecommunications services, increasing their usefulness and making
them, so far as possible, generally available to the public;
(c) to harmonize the actions of nations in the attainment of those ends.
2. To this end, the Union shall in particular:
(a) effect allocation of the radio frequency spectrum and registration of radio frequency assignments
in order to avoid harmful interference between radio stations of different countries;
(b) coordinate efforts to eliminate harmful interference between radio stations of different countries
and to improve the use made of the radio frequency spectrum;
(c) coordinate efforts with a.view to harmonizing the development of telecommunications facilities,
notably those using space techniques, with a view to full advantage being taken of their possibilities;
(d) foster collaboration among its Members with a view to the establishment of rates at levels as low
as possible consistent with an.efficient service and taking into account the necessity for maintaining
independent financial administration of telecommunication on a sound basis;
(e) foster the creation, development and improvement of telecommunication equipment and net-
works in developing countries by every means at its disposal, especially its participation in the appro-
priate programmes of the United Nations;
(0 promote the adoption of measures for ensuring the safety of life through the cooperation of tele-
communication services;
(g) undertake studies, make regulations, adopt resolutions, formulate recommendations and opin-
ions, and collect and publish information concerning telecommunication matters.
Id. art. 4.
19. Convention Telegraphique Internationale de Paris, May 13, 17, 1865, Brit. & For. St. Papers 56-
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today."' 20 At the Berlin Radio Conference of 1906, a separate organization, the
International Radiotelegraph Union, was formed to deal with the telegraph's wire-
less counterpart. 2' The two organizations merged in 1932 to form the Interna-
tional Telecommunication Union.22
From 1932 to the present, the ITU has survived a World War and numerous
international conflicts and has adapted to coordinate the ever-increasing interna-
tional use of rapidly developing telecommunication technology.2 3 Most recently,
the Union has attempted to find a proper role for itself as it has taken on many
new members with different kinds of telecommunication concerns. The ITU's
membership of 78 countries in 1947 increased to 155 in 1981.24 More importantly,
the majority of these new members and, now, a majority of the organization's
entire membership are developing nations that have begun to question the ITU's
customary method of assigning frequencies, 25 to demand technical assistance for
their incipient national telecommunication systems, and sometimes to inject a
degree of north-south politics into ITU proceedings. 26
B. The ITU's Current Structure
Over the years the ITU has evolved a structure of plenary and permanent
administrative components recognized as being unique in the community of inter-
national organizations. A study of the ITU conducted before the most recent
assembly of the organization's general membership (Plenipotentiary Conference)
was somewhat critical of the ITU's structure:
Its organizational growth has mirrored the growth of international communication: as the
latter has developed, new organs and functions have been grafted onto the pre-existing ITU
structure, with relatively little throught as to how well the old and new parts fitted together.
The result is a plethora of different conferences, assemblies, organs, and secretariats.
2 7
Despite these perceived deficiencies, the study ultimately concluded that the ITU's
structure was fundamentally sound and in no need of major change.
20. G. CODDING, JR., THE INTERNATIONA. TELECOMMUNICATION UNION 4 (1952) [hereinafter cited
as CODDING (1952)].
21. International Wireless Telegraph Convention Nov. 3, 1906, 37 Stat. 1565, T.S. No, 568. See also
CODDING (1952), supra note 20, at 84-108.
22. See supra note 13.
23. See generally D. LEIVE, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION, A
REPORT FOR THE 1973 PLENIPOTENTIARY CONFERENCE PANEL ON INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICA-
TION POLICY (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1973 POLICY REPORT]; Mili, Plenipotentaqy Conference, a rehiminay
Assessment, The ITU Renewed, 41 TELECOM. J. 2 (1974); Rutkowski, The 1979 World Administrative Radio
Conference, The ITU in a Changing World, 13 INT'L LAw 289 (1979).
24. The 60% increase in the Union's membership since 1959 is entirely due to the addition of devel-
oping nations. See 1979 WARC REPORT, supra note 14, at 16.
25. The ITU traditionally has considered first use and registration important in establishing priorities
among frequency assignments. Poorer countries and developing nations that have only recently entered the
telecommunication field in a meaningful way tend to see this policy as unduly favoring more affluent or
industrialized nations. As an alternative, the emerging nations advocate assignment of frequencies in
advance of actual use, giving each country its fair share. See Rutkowski, supra note 23, at 293-94.
26. The scope of this article does not permit a detailed discussion of the issues that divide industrial-
ized and developing member nations of the ITU. For an in-depth treatment of this topic, see 1979 WARC
REPORT, supra note 14; Codding, The United States and the ITU in a Changing World, 44 TELECOM. J. 231
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Codding (1973)].
27. See 1973 POLICY REPORT, supra note 23, at 2.
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1. The Plenipotentiay Conference. The supreme authority of the ITU rests in its
Plenipotentiary Conference, which consists of all member nations and convenes
approximately once during every decade.2 8 Only the Plenipotentiary Conference
can revise the International Telecommunication Convention.29 This body also
fixes the organization's budget and fills key administrative positions by electing a
thirty-six member Administrative Council from the ITU general membership and
by appointing the organization's Secretary General.3 0
2. The Administrative Council. The Administrative Council meets for one month
each year between Plenipotentiary Conference years. This body is responsible for
implementing ITU policies and regulations and overseeing the administrative
work of the Union's General Secretariat. In electing the Council, the Plenipoten-
tiary Conference must attempt to insure the representation of all regions. 3 1
3. The General Secretariat. The Secretary General is the chief executive and legal
representative of the ITU. He is responsible for carrying out the orders of the
Administrative Council and managing the ITU's permanent staff.32
4. The Admzristratize Conference. Regulations implementing the Convention and
ITU policy are promulgated by World and Regional Administrative Conferences
that meet at irregular intervals to consider special telecommunication matters such
as radio frequency allocation and satellite communications. 33
5. The International Frequency Registration Board The important task of interna-
tional frequency coordination is entrusted to the International Frequency Regis-
tration Board (IFRB), a permanent ITU organ whose five members are technical
experts elected by the Plenipotentiary Conference. 34
6. The Consultative Committees. The research and development activities of the
ITU are the principal responsibility of the International Radio Consultative Com-
mittee and the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee. 35
These permanent bodies and their subsidiary study groups conduct on-going
research and make recommendations on specific technical questions. ?6
III
THE ITU's ROLE IN THE MANAGEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATION CONFLICTS
Although the ITU is empowered to play a role in both the prevention and the
28. 1973 Convention, supra note 17, arts. 6, 53.
29. Id. art. 6(2)(i).
30. Id. art. 6(2)(0, (g).
31. Id arts. 7, 55.
32. Id. arts. 9, 56.
33. Id arts. 7, 54.
34. Id. arts. 10, 57.
35. Id arts. 11, 58,
36. The work of the Consultative Committees in promulgating recommendations recently has taken
on greater significance. Because the Consultative Committees and their study groups are smaller than the
Administrative Conferences and because they function on an on-going basis, they can deal with rapidly
changing technology more effectively and quickly. Although the recommendations do not have the same
legal status as do the regulations, the strength of both kinds of official statements depends upon voluntary
compliance of ITU members. Accordingly, the practical advantages of recommendations are seen as out-
weighing their inferior legal status. See Mili, supra note 2, at 562-66.
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resolution of international telecommunication conflicts, greater emphasis is placed
on its preventative role. This focus reflects the reluctance of the organization's
members, all sovereign states, to relinquish much control over the attainment of
their national telecommunication objectives.3 7 Thus, the ITU operates principally
as a forum in which the nations of the world attempt to achieve consensus on
general standards of telecommunication conduct that are more or less acceptable,
if not to the entire membership, then at least to the majority. 38
A. Conflict Prevention
Quite a few of the ITU's activities are informative and educational. The
research of the Consultative Committees, the technical assistance programs, and
the ITU's publications all contribute to the prevention of conflict between nations
by making them aware of situations in which clashes are likely to occur and of the
means for averting them. 39 Nations well informed on telecommunication matters
are less likely to blunder into conflicts inadvertently. If a nation is inclined to
cooperate, ITU educational efforts will better equip it to do so.
The ITU also serves "as a forum at which agreements [are] reached as to what
part of the radio spectrum would be used for what purpose by what countries in
what part of the world."' 40 More recently, the organization has also commenced
efforts to coordinate placement of communications satellites in the geostationary
orbit. 4' These duties, principally the responsibility of the IFRB, are the most
important component of ITU's ability to prevent international conflicts.
By maintaining a record of frequency assignments and usage as well as of
details on space communications systems, the IFRB enables ITU members to
avoid coming into conflict with each other.42 In deploying satellite communica-
tion systems or initiating use of certain frequencies in international or domestic
communication with international ramifications, ITU member administrators
must notify the IFRB. The IFRB then (i) reviews each proposal for conformity
with the Convention, regulations, and any applicable regional service agreement;
(ii) examines it for potential interference with other assignments in the interna-
tional register; and (iii) includes it in a weekly bulletin circulated among the other
37. See infa note 76.
38. 1973 Convention, supra note 17, art. 77(15).
39. In addition to its regular service publications (weekly circular letters; directories of addresses of
member nations' telecommunication administrations, private operating agencies and scientific or industrial
organizations; statistical yearbooks; and reports on various administratave conferences), the ITU publishes
a monthly journal and a number of glossaries of technical terms and instructional manuals and handbooks
dealing with topics such as telephone signalling and switching, joining of plastic-sheathed cables, protec-
tion of telecommunication equipment against lightning discharges and ionospheric propagation. Most of
these publications are available in a trilingual edition (French, English and Spanish). The Union also
sponsors training seminars held in various locations, with a particular emphasis on making the sessions
easily accessible for developing nations. See INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION, LIST OF PUB-
LICATIONS (Dec. 1980).
40. Ende, International Communications: Hstog of International Rado, Cable and Satellite Communications; The
Dfirences in Regu/atog Approach jfom Domestic Commumcations; Spectal International Relationships, Institutions, law
and Treaties, 28 FED. CoM. B.J. 147, 163 (1975).
41. 1973 Convention, supra note 17, art. 4(2)(e); ITU Radio Regulations, art. 11 (1982).
42. The duties of the IFRB are set forth in ITU Radio Regulations, art. 10 (1982).
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members for comment or objection. 43 Notices that pass Board review and draw no
objection from other members are logged in the ITU record system as entitled to
international recognition and protection against subsequent interfering uses. 44
Proposed assignments that are inconsistent with the international allocation
scheme or existing usage are appropriately noted in IFRB records and may give
rise to additional Board activities discussed below. By consulting IFRB records
and observing its coordination procedures, ITU members can avoid many
conflicts. 45
B. Conflict Resolution
In case ITU conflict prevention measures are unsuccessful, the Convention also
provides procedures for resolving disputes after they arise.46 Although the IFRB's
functions are mainly preventative, the Board is also empowered to assist member
countries in resolving cases of interference resulting from actual or proposed use of
frequencies or orbital slots. Because the IFRB's current role in conflict resolution
is only a limited, advisory one, the integrity of the ITU's frequency allocation
scheme must rely upon voluntary compliance. For the most part, the ITU strongly
encourages members to find ways of resolving their disputes without involving the
organization or its staff. Nevertheless, the Convention does provide for arbitration
if the parties cannot agree on another method. 47 Because the ITU procedures for
conflict resolution combine the features of several well-accepted methods for
resolving international disputes, it is helpful to consider the ITU procedures in the
context of the general law of international conflict resolution.
1. International Conflct Resolution--Generally. It is well accepted that, absent force,
no sovereign nation can be made to take any action, adhere to any code of con-
duct, or comply with any decision without its consent. 4 Thus, the effectiveness of
every peaceful method of conflict resolution is limited to some degree by the doc-
trine of state sovereignty. 49 Although various legally recognized methods of con-
flict resolution frequently are referred to as binding or nonbinding, in reality they
differ only with respect to when a nation's consent is given. Even in binding forms
of conflict resolution such as arbitration and adjudication, the parties must consent
43. IFRB administered coordination, notification, and registration procedures, which vary for dif-
ferent radio services and frequency bands, are set forth in ITU Radio Regulations, arts. 11-17 (1982).
44. See, e.g., ITU Radio Regulations, art. 12, § 13(2) (1982).
45. Pursuant to the 1973 Convention, art. 35, each ITU member nation is responsible for insuring
that communications under its jurisdiction comply with international standards. In the United States, this
responsibility rests with the FCC. The Communications Act of 1934, as amended, from which the FCC
derives its regulatory jurisdiction, gives the agency authority over foreign commerce in wire and radio
communication and empowers it, among other duties, to suspend the license of any operator who has
violated the provisions of any treaty or convention to which the United States is a party. 47 U.S.C. §§ 101,
303(m) (1976).
46. See 1973 Convention, supra note 17, art. 50.
47. Id. art. 81.
48. Seegeneral4y L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 117-23 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955).
49. See generally W. REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION: REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNA-
TIONAL JUDGMENTS AND AWARDS (1971).
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to submit their dispute to the tribunal in question. Implicit in submission of the
matter is the agreement to be bound by the tribunal's decision.50
Nonbinding forms of conflict resolution typically are used when nations wish to
retain maximum control over the conduct and outcome of the proceedings. Dis-
puting nations may undertake to resolve a conflict strictly on their own through
diplomatic channels or with minimal involvement of a third party as in good
offices, mediation, or conciliation. In either case, the parties to the dispute do not
agree in advance on exactly what will take place, nor do they agree to await a
third-party decision and to be bound by it. The consent of the parties must be
present at all times in order for the process to go forward.
Although nonbinding forms of conflict resolution are flexible, they lack both
certainty and objectivity. In diplomatic conflict resolution, both parties are repre-
sented by advocates who may find it difficult to view the issues in dispute impar-
tially. Moreover, the same diplomatic personnel charged with resolving a conflict
in one situation may be waging a conflict in another.5' Because their responsibili-
ties are numerous and varied, ambassadorial personnel may be hampered in their
ability to resolve a conflict by a lack of specific knowledge or of the opportunity to
devote their full attention to the subject matter at hand. Use of good offices, con-
ciliation or mediation may inject greater objectivity into the process, but these
methods also lack certainty. Furthermore, the neutral third party neither finds
facts nor renders decisions, but merely facilitates communication between the par-
ties and makes informal, nonbinding suggestions if asked. As in diplomatic con-
flict resolution, the success of good offices, conciliation and mediation finally
depends on the agreement of the parties.
It is well recognized that nations are somewhat reluctant to submit disputes to
forms of resolution considered to be binding, particularly adjudication. Thus, as
Reisman points out, "When state elites have submitted matters to adjudication,
the subject of the dispute has often been of minor consequence."' 52 Nevertheless,
adjudication is not without its advantages. Resort' to an international judicial
body eliminates the time-consuming and difficult task of constituting a tribunal
after the dispute has arisen and affords greater certainty through prescribed proce-
dures and decisions based on precedent. Whether because of the commitment a
nation makes in submitting a matter to adjudication, the prestige of the tribunal,
the nation's desire to avoid adverse international reaction, or simply the inconse-
quential nature of the matter submitted, compliance with international adjudica-
tory orders has been found to surpass that of other forms of international conflict
resolution. 53
Arbitration is somewhat less predictable than adjudication, principally because
the arbitral tribunal is usually constituted specifically for each case and reaches its
50. See J. SIMPSON & H. Fox, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW AND PRACTICE 42 (1959). The
parties may consent to submit their dispute for settlement after it has arisen or far in advance as, for
example, when they sign a treaty or join an international organization that provides for resolution of
conflicts exclusively by arbitration or adjudication.
51. See P. JACOB, A. ATHERTON & A. WALLENSTEIN, THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANI-
ZATION: THE MAKING OF WORLD ORDER 258 (rev. ed. 1972).
52. W. REISMAN, supra note 49, 222-23.
53. Id. at 226-27.
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decision on the basis of equity rather than legal precedent. 54 These features are
sometimes viewed as advantages, however, because they allow the parties greater
input on how a conflict will be resolved. Thus, arbitration combines some of the
flexibility of nonbinding forms of conflict resolution with the basic commitment to
await an end result that exists in adjudication. Among the accepted forms of arbi-
tration are the single arbitrator, who is selected by agreement of the disputants; the
joint commission that consists of two arbitrators, one representing each side or
party; the mixed commission (basically a joint commission with recourse to a neu-
tral umpire in the event of a deadlock); and the collegiate court composed of a
member appointed by each side and an uneven number of neutral members
selected jointly by the first two members, by the agreement of the parties or by
some disinterested party.55 Speed and administrative efficiency are often sacri-
ficed in an effort to constitute a more impartial arbitral tribunal.
2. ITU Conflict Resolution Procedures. The ITU is not designed to serve as a forum
for conflict resolution. 56 Because of the reluctance of its members to submit their
disputes in every instance to binding resolution, the absence of a permanent arbi-
tral tribunal or judicial body within the ITU is no accident. Nevertheless, in rec-
ognition of the fact that disputes are bound to arise and that an international
organization may provide a convenient forum for resolving them, the Union's
members have agreed to certain measures for dealing with conflicts after they
arise.
a. The IFRB's Role. Should the Board discover a case of potential or actual
interference5 7 through its own review of a notice or through the objection of an
ITU member, it advises all interested nations and can assist them in resolving the
problem. Even though the ITU's international frequency coordination scheme is
intended principally to prevent conflicts, the IFRB's duties include the rendering
of special assistance, "the investigation, at the request of one or more of the iterested
administrations, of harmful interference, and the formulation of recommendations
with respect thereto."' 58 In responding to requests for special assistance, the IFRB's
activities have some of the features of mediation. If both parties or sides in a fre-
quency conflict are willing, the Board can facilitate communication between them
and can make recommendations as to how the problem can be solved. Moreover,
Board members must act not as representatives of their respective countries but as
"custodians of an international public trust."5 9 As a result, conflict resolution by
the IFRB is likely to have more objectivity than would normally exist in mediation
in which the parties select the mediators. The IFRB's role in conflict resolution is
somewhat broader than the usual role of mediator in that the Board is engaged in
54. See J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 256 (4th ed. 1949).
55. Some forms of arbitration are discussed in greater detail in J. SIMPSON & H. Fox, supra note 50, at
34-39.
56. See infta note 76 and supra note 38.
57. In certain circumstances, IFRB procedures allow for the giving of notice after a frequency has
been put into use. ITU Radio Regulations, art. 12, § 3(i) (1982). In addition, ITU members are
encouraged to report cases of infringement of the Convention or noncompliance with the regulations. 1973
Convention, szpra note 17, art. 24; ITU Radio Regulations, arts. 21, 22 (1982).
58. ITU Radio Regulations, art. 11, § 2(g) (1982) (emphasis added).
59. 1973 Convention, supra note 17, arts. 10(2), 59(4).
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fact-finding. Given the requirement that Board members possess special technical
qualifications, 60 however, their investigative powers seem justified. Although the
IFRB is empowered to investigate and advise, it lacks positive enforcement
authority and cannot impose any particular solution or, indeed, any solution at all
on the parties in conflict. 6 '
b. ITUArbitratzon. If conflicts are not resolvable through IFRB special assist-
ance procedures, the Convention encourages members to settle their disputes
involving interpretation or application of the Convention or Regulations outside
the ITU through diplomatic channels, procedures established by other treaties to
which they are parties, or "any other method agreed upon. 6 2 Only in the event
that the parties to a dispute find these alternatives unacceptable does the Conven-
tion provide for direct involvement of the ITU, and then in only the most limited
way.
If the parties cannot agree on another method, the Convention provides that
conflicts between ITU members may be resolved by arbitration. 63 Even within
the context of the arbitration provision, the parties have a great deal of latitude.
They may select either a single arbitrator or a collegiate court composed of two
members-one appointed by each party or side-who jointly select a third, neutral
member.64 If the disputing parties cannot agree on a single arbitrator, the Con-
vention provides that each must nominate a candidate between whom the ITU
Secretary General will select by drawing lots. 65 The same procedure is followed if
the first two members of a collegiate court cannot agree on the third.66
The arbitration provision also contains procedures to insure that conflicts are
resolved as quickly and as fairly as possible. In an effort to avoid unnecessary
delays associated with constituting a tribunal, there is a time limit of three months
for appointment of arbitrators.6 7  A provision requiring the parties to share
equally in the cost of arbitration reduces uncertainty, in this area.68 Where the
members of the tribunal will be individuals, none can be a citizen, domiciliary or
employee of any party to the dispute.69 Similar restrictions are placed on govern-
ments or administrations that serve as tribunal members. 70
A number of the ITU member countries have gone one step beyond the Con-
vention's arbitration provision by accepting compulsory arbitration for the settle-
ment of disputes in which they are involved. Pursuant to an Optional Additional
Protocol, these countries have agreed that if none of the other methods of resolu-
tion provided for in article 50 are agreed upon by common consent, "disputes
60. Id. art. 57(1), (2).
61. ITU Radio Regulations, art. 10, § 2(g) (1982).
62. 1973 Convention, supra note 17, art. 50(1).
63. Id. art. 50(2).
64. Members of the tribunal may be individuals, governments or national telecommunication admin-
istrations. Id. art. 81(2).
65. Id. art. 81(7).
66. Id. art. 81(8).
67. Id. art. 81(5).
68. Id. art. 81(11).
69. Id. art. 81(3).
70. Id. art. 81(4).
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concerning the interpretation or application of the Regulations . . . shall, at the
request of one of the parties to the dispute, be submitted to arbitration."' 7' In
contrast, the 1973 Convention itself provides that if another method of resolution
is not selected, disputes may be settled by arbitration in accordance with the arbi-
tration procedures.
7 2
IV
AN ASSESSMENT
The ITU's role in the management of telecommunication conflicts definitely is
geared toward prevention, and only limited, noncontroversial participation is envi-
sioned in conflict resolution. By conferring certain powers on the IFRB and by
establishing an arbitration procedure, the Plenipotentiary Conference has created
an opportunity for the settlement of disputes that cannot be prevented. Neverthe-
less, there is an apparent reluctance among ITU members officially to involve
organization machinery in the conflict resolution process.
Although the IFRB's expertise and investigative powers enable it to do more
than a traditional mediator, it lacks the authority of an arbitrator or adjudicator
to render binding decisions. Apart from the Board and its limited role in interfer-
ence matters, the only ITU organ with an official role in conflict resolution is the
Secretary General, whose function of drawing lots to break deadlocks in the selec-
tion of arbitrators is neither substantive nor otherwise significant. 73 It is possible
that in devising their own method for settling a dispute under article 50 of the
1973 Convention the parties could agree to involve an ITU functionary as medi-
ator or arbitrator. Although the Convention does not appear to preclude this,
neither does it encourage such use of its personnel. Finally, when the citizens,
government, or telecommunication administrations of ITU member countries
serve on arbitral panels under article 81, they are intended to do so in their own
capacities and not as official agents of the ITU.
From time to time it has been suggested that the ITU needs to become more
active in the conflict resolution process, ostensibly because the higher stakes
involved in contemporary telecommunication conflicts warrant it. 74 Among the
alternatives proposed are the creation within ITU of a World Communications
Court or the enlargement of the IFRB's functions to include settlement of disputes
by arbitration. As telecommunication continues its rapid development, and as
more and more countries take advantage of the new technologies, it is appropriate
to reassess the organization's role in conflict management to determine whether a
new and stronger approach toward conflict resolution really is necessary.
71. Optional Additional Protocol to the International Telecommunication Convention, Oct. 25, 1973,
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, 1975 Austl. T.S. 24, art. I (emphasis added). It is noted that most
major powers, including the United States, have neither signed nor acceded to this protocol.
72. 1973 Convention, supra note 17, art. 50(2) (emphasis added).
73. Id., art. 81(7), (8).
74. See, e.g., D. LEIVE, INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAv: THE
REGULATION OF THE RADIO SPECTRUM 313-15 (1970); JOHN AND MARY R. MARKLE FOUNDATION,
GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS IN THE SPACE AGE: TOWARD A NEW ITU 15-17 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
MARKLE REPORT).
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One way to evaluate the need for such change is to examine the history of
conflict resolution in the ITU, with particular emphasis on arbitration, currently
the strongest available measure for settlement of disputes between ITU members.
In the past, the arbitration procedures have been largely ignored, with members
preferring to resolve their disputes through bilateral negotiation.7 5 A further indi-
cation that expansion of ITU jurisdiction might not be very effective is the fact
that only about one-third of the ITU's members, and few major powers, have
agreed to submit their disputes to binding arbitration by signing the Additional
Optional Protocol on settlement of disputes. 76 Most important, the reluctance of
nations to resort to binding forms of conflict resolution administered by an ITU
organ in the past does not appear either to have diminished the organization's
effectiveness or to have adversely affected world telecommunication order. If expe-
rience in other areas of international endeavor is any indication, the higher the
stakes in telecommunication disputes become, the less likely nations will be to
submit to binding third-party resolution.
77
Even if more nations agree to strengthen and expand the ITU's role in conflict
resolution, there is no guarantee that conflicts will be resolved more rapidly or
effectively. It is well recognized that binding forms of conflict resolution can be
substantially weakened by qualifying their applicability. 78 Moreover, parties to an
adjudication or arbitration can legitimately employ devices such as requests for
interpretations, appeals or even withdrawal from ITU to delay or avoid complying
with binding decisions that are unfavorable.7 9
General experience in international affairs suggests that conflicts are most
likely to be resolved when nations are given a choice of the method they will use to
settle their differences. 80 In resolving telecommmunication disputes, ITU mem-
bers can select among all the established forms of international conflict resolution
and can even devise new methods of their own. By not excluding any method of
conflict resolution, the ITU Convention makes available the benefits of them all:
75. As Leive notes, precise statistics are not kept on resolution of ITU member disputes by arbitration
or other means. See D. LEIVE, supra note 74, at 129-36. Of the few cases in which resort to arbitration was
attempted, none involved harmful interference. The one significant reported arbitration case under ITU
procedures involved a 1935 dispute over suspension of telegraph services. See Affaire de la Societ& Radio-
Orient (Fr. v. Egypt), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1871 (1980), 37 AM.J. INT'L L. 341 (1943). See a/so CODDING
(1952), supra note 20, at 309-11; MARKLE REPORT, supra note 74, at 16.
76. Conspicuously absent from the signatories to this Protocol are Great Britain, the United States,
the Soviet Union (and other Soviet bloc states), France, and West Germany, all major industrialized users
of telecommunications. It has been suggested that more powerful nations are content to entrust their
welfare in international conflicts to the wielding of their considerable political or economic clout, while less
powerful countries desire the intervention of a major international organization on their behalf. See, e.g.,
D. LEIVE, supra note 74, at 27.
77. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., Bernhardt, Compulsoy Dispute Settlement in the Law of the Sea Negotiatons: A Reassessment, 19
VA. J. INT'L L. 69, 73-98 (1978).
79. Article 47 of the 1973 Convention contains procedures for denunciation of the Convention by
member states. For further legal discussion of this topic, see generally W. REISMAN, supra note 49, at 637-
73; Akehurst, Withdrawalfrom International Organizations, 32 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 143 (1979).
80. For a discussion of the relative degree of success that other international organizations have
achieved in resolving disputes, see Bockstiegel, Arbitration and Adjudication Regarding Activties in Outer Space, 6
J. SPACE L. 3, 18 (1978).
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the control of bilateral negotiations, the flexibility of mediation, the objectivity of
arbitrations, or the certainty of adjudication.
In the final analysis, the success of any international endeavor requires the
voluntary cooperation of the sovereign nations involved. Realistically, such coop-
eration is most likely to exist when it is in a nation's self-interest. One survey of
international organizations recognized, "In some cases, the very nature of the func-
tions of the agency gives it a more effective sanction (i.e., where the agency can
withhold a valuable service from members)." ' " Catering to its members' self-
interests is one of the ITU's greatest strengths. If, for example, a member nation
desires international recognition and protection of its frequency assignments, it
must adhere to international standards. When a frequency conflict arises despite
preventative measures, it is often in the parties' interests to follow the IFRB's
advice, if not as a means of eliminating an immediate case of interference then as a
way of insuring cooperation of other nations in future situations.
As nations become more reliant on telecommunication, they will be less able to
ignore situations that render their services unusable. Similarly, as their level of
financial commitment to telecommunication facilities and services increases,
nations will be less willing to risk actions that would diminish the return on invest-
ment. In satellite communication, the great cost and difficulty of eliminating
harmful interference after it has occurred makes educational and informational
activities more important. Clearly, the incentives for international cooperation
before conflicts arise can only be expected to become stronger.
Recent events suggest that the ITU's first priority should be to fight for its life
by discouraging political and ideological confrontation unrelated to telecommuni-
cation. Assuming that the organization can continue not only to survive but also
to function effectively in the current international climate, it must continue to
work for consensus among nations in establishing acceptable but effective stan-
dards for preventing telecommunication conflicts. Given the inherent limitations
on all conflict resolution mechanisms, the ITU's resources are best used to educate
its members and thereby to enhance their ability and willingness to comply with
international standards. It is doubtful that engrafting new judicial organs on the
present ITU structure, increasing the authority of the IFRB, or involving other
ITU organs more extensively in conflict resolution will be more effective than the
present basic approach.
This is not to say, however, that the existing procedures cannot be improved.
If the present emphasis and reliance upon conflict prevention is to continue, the
Union must make it easier for ITU members to understand the standards that
apply. The present regulations fill several volumes, and like many domestic gov-
ernment regulatory schemes they suffer from ambiguity and unnecessary use of
"bureaucratese. '8 2 The need for precision and clarity is especially acute when reg-
ulations deal with highly technical matters.
81. D. BowEl-r, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 128 (1963). See also D. LEIvE, supra
note 74, at 24-25.
82. "Bureaucratese" is a confusing and verbose language frequently employed by government officials
and understood only with great difficulty by members of the public for whose benefit it is used.
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In addition, the importance of the Union's technical assistance programs and
other educational efforts should not be underestimated. In the past, the United
States and other technically advanced ITU member nations have been somewhat
reluctant to support these efforts.8 3 As major financial contributors to ITU, these
nations are understandably concerned that the organization's funds are spent
wisely.8 4 Nevertheless, if proper controls are employed, it is in all ITU members'
best interests that less technically sophisticated countries acquire the necessary
knowledge and skill to operate their national telecommunication facilities in
accordance with accepted international standards.
Finally, the cost of equipping the IFRB to serve as an arbitrator or adjudicator
of disputes is not warranted either by the number of times members are likely to
resort to such a tribunal or by the likelihood of compliance with its decisions. Nev-
ertheless, the IFRB can be made more effective in the mediation and conciliation
of conflicts if care is taken to appoint well-qualified, technical experts to serve as
Board members and to provide them with the resources they need to carry out
their mission.8 5 Even though it is essential to keep political considerations from
dominating the conflict resolution process, the Board members and staff must be
aware of the political and social ramifications of their technical findings. In addi-
tion, the Board should not be required to wait until requested by the parties to
become involved in a conflict, but should be empowered to attempt to initiate
discussions or offer suggestions.
Above all, reformers of the ITU should always bear in mind, particularly
before substantial financial commitments are made, that the Union has been and
will continue to be most effective when it capitalizes upon the self-interests of
member countries. The ITU's efforts in informing and educating its members will
be especially important in identifying those self-interests.
83. See, e.g., Codding (1973), supra note 26, at 231.
84. Article 15 of the Convention, which governs the Union's finances, allows for members to elect the
size of contribution they will make. See 1973 Convention, supra note 17, art. 15.
85. The importance of well-qualified civil servants to the effectiveness of any international organiza-
tion is discussed generally in James, The Concept of the International CivilServiie, in INTERNATIONAL ADMINIS-
TRATION: ITS EVOLUTION AND CONTEMPORARY APPLICATIONS (R. Jordan ed. 1971).
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